Security games with surveillance cost and optimal timing of attack execution

@inproceedings{An2013SecurityGW,
  title={Security games with surveillance cost and optimal timing of attack execution},
  author={Bo An and Matthew Brown and Yevgeniy Vorobeychik and Milind Tambe},
  booktitle={AAMAS},
  year={2013}
}
Stackelberg games have been used in several deployed applications to allocate limited resources for critical infrastructure protection. These resource allocation strategies are randomized to prevent a strategic attacker from using surveillance to learn and exploit patterns in the allocation. Past work has typically assumed that the attacker has perfect knowledge of the defender’s randomized strategy or can learn the defender’s strategy after conducting a fixed period of surveillance. In… CONTINUE READING

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