• Corpus ID: 117003866

Security Issues Associated With Error Correction And Privacy Amplification In Quantum Key Distribution

  title={Security Issues Associated With Error Correction And Privacy Amplification In Quantum Key Distribution},
  author={Horace P. Yuen},
  journal={arXiv: Quantum Physics},
  • H. Yuen
  • Published 10 November 2014
  • Computer Science
  • arXiv: Quantum Physics
Privacy amplification is a necessary step in all quantum key distribution protocols, and error correction is needed in each except when signals of many photons are used in the key communication in quantum noise approach. No security analysis of error correcting code information leak to the attacker has ever been provided, while an ad hoc formula is currently employed to account for such leak in the key generation rate. It is also commonly believed that privacy amplification allows the users to… 

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