Security Games with Multiple Attacker Resources

@inproceedings{Korzhyk2011SecurityGW,
  title={Security Games with Multiple Attacker Resources},
  author={Dmytro Korzhyk and Vincent Conitzer and Ronald Parr},
  booktitle={IJCAI},
  year={2011}
}
Algorithms for finding game-theoretic solutions are now used in several real-world security applications. This work has generally assumed a Stackelberg model where the defender commits to a mixed strategy first. In general two-player normal-form games, Stackelberg strategies are easier to compute than Nash equilibria, though it has recently been shown that in many security games, Stackelberg strategies are also Nash strategies for the defender. However, the work on security games so far assumes… CONTINUE READING

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