Security Games With Information Leakage: Modeling and Computation

@inproceedings{Xu2015SecurityGW,
  title={Security Games With Information Leakage: Modeling and Computation},
  author={Haifeng Xu and Albert Xin Jiang and Arunesh Sinha and Zinovi Rabinovich and Shaddin Dughmi and Milind Tambe},
  booktitle={IJCAI},
  year={2015}
}
Most models of Stackelberg security games assume that the attacker only knows the defender’s mixed strategy, but is not able to observe (even partially) the instantiated pure strategy. Such partial observation of the deployed pure strategy – an issue we refer to as information leakage – is a significant concern in practical applications. While previous research on patrolling games has considered the attacker’s real-time surveillance, our settings, therefore models and techniques, are… CONTINUE READING
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