• Corpus ID: 235422569

Security Analysis of the Silver Bullet Technique for RowHammer Prevention

  title={Security Analysis of the Silver Bullet Technique for RowHammer Prevention},
  author={Abdullah Giray Yaglikçi and Jeremie S. Kim and Fabrice Devaux and Onur Mutlu},
The purpose of this document is to study the security properties of the Silver Bullet algorithm against worst-case RowHammer attacks. We mathematically demonstrate that Silver Bullet, when properly configured and implemented in a DRAM chip, can securely prevent RowHammer attacks. The demonstration focuses on the most representative implementation of Silver Bullet, the patent claiming many implementation possibilities not covered in this demonstration. Our study concludes that Silver Bullet is a… 

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