Securitization Without Risk Transfer

@article{Acharya2010SecuritizationWR,
  title={Securitization Without Risk Transfer},
  author={Viral Acharya and Philipp Schnabl and Gustavo A. Suarez},
  journal={Banking \& Insurance eJournal},
  year={2010}
}
We analyze asset-backed commercial paper conduits, which experienced a shadow-banking "run" and played a central role in the early phase of the financial crisis of 2007-09. We document that commercial banks set up conduits to securitize assets worth $1.3 trillion while insuring the newly securitized assets using explicit guarantees. We show that regulatory arbitrage was the main motive behind setting up conduits: the guarantees were structured so as to reduce regulatory capital requirements… 
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