Secure proximity-based identity pairing using an untrusted signalling service

Abstract

New protocols such as WebRTC promise seamless in-browser peer-to-peer communications that in theory remove the need for third-party services. In practice, widespread use of Firewalls, NATS and dynamic IP addresses mean that overlay addressing or use of some fixed rendezvous point is still needed. In this paper we describe a proximity-based pairing scheme that uses a signalling service to minimise the trust requirements on the third party, achieving anonymity and avoiding the need for PKI, while still requiring only a simple asymmetric pairing protocol.

DOI: 10.1109/CCNC.2016.7444914

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Cite this paper

@article{Panton2016SecurePI, title={Secure proximity-based identity pairing using an untrusted signalling service}, author={Tim Panton and David Llewellyn-Jones and Nathan Shone and Mahmoud Hashem Eiza}, journal={2016 13th IEEE Annual Consumer Communications & Networking Conference (CCNC)}, year={2016}, pages={942-947} }