Secure implementation experiments: Do strategy-proof mechanisms really work?

Abstract

† We thank anonymous referees and an associate editor for their useful comments. 2 ABSTRACT Strategy-proofness, requiring that truth-telling is a dominant strategy, is a standard concept used in social choice theory. Saijo et al. (2003) argue that this concept has serious drawbacks. In particular, many strategy-proof mechanisms have a continuum of Nash… (More)
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2005.12.007

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Cite this paper

@article{Cason2006SecureIE, title={Secure implementation experiments: Do strategy-proof mechanisms really work?}, author={Timothy N. Cason and Tatsuyoshi Saijo and Tomas Sj{\"{o}str{\"{o}m and Takehiko Yamato}, journal={Games and Economic Behavior}, year={2006}, volume={57}, pages={206-235} }