Create Presentation
Download Presentation

Download Presentation
## Class 21: Bidding Strategy and Simulation

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - E N D - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

**Class 21: Bidding Strategy and Simulation**• What is a “bidding strategy”? • System of determining what to bid • For example: signal with winner’s curse subtracted • How do we determine what is a good strategy? • Do simulation and see what would happen in the long run**Bidding Strategies We May Consider**• Bid our signal • Bid our signal minus Winner’s Curse • Bid our signal minus both the Winner’s Curse and the Winner’s Blessing • Optimize our bid if all others subtract WC + WB • Optimize our bid if all others subtract WC • Find stable equilibrium Today: Strategy 2 and 3: Simulation to estimate the Winner’s Curse and Winner’s Blessing**Strategy 1-Bid $264.9M-Bid your signal. What will happen?**Give reasoning for your analysis Had all companies bid their signals, the losses would have been huge, ranging from 14.1 to 37.3 million dollars! Evidently, bidding one’s signal is a disastrous strategy. Strategy 1 not optimal because the extra profit values for the historic auctions are all negative, indicating that each winner paid more for the lease than it was worth to the company.**Strategy 1-Bid $264.9M**“Winner’s Extra Profit” is almost always negative. That is, the winning company will not get its needed fair return on the lease. Strategy 1 is not optimal because, the highest signal will almost always be well above the value of the lease and the winning company will have paid too much for the drilling rights. This is called the winner’s curse(we will learn how to calculate after simulation of Normal Errors).**Winner’s Curse**• Average amount of money lost by the company that wins the bid if all companies bid their signals • Estimate the winner’s curse by finding the average amount by which the highest signal exceeds the proven value • Winner’s curse is the average maximum error**Strategy 2: Remove Winner’s Curse**Strategy: All companies bid their signal reduced by winner’s curse • Company with highest signal wins • On average, winner does not loose money • But on average winner does not make money**Winner’s Blessing**• Average amount paid by winner above the second highest bid; this money is wasted • Estimate the winner’s blessing as the difference between the highest and second highest signals • Winner’s blessing is the difference between the largest and second largest errors**Strategy 3: Remove Winner’s Curse AND Winner’s Blessing**Strategy: All companies bid their signal reduced by the winner’s curse plus the winner’s blessing • Company with the highest signal wins • On average, the winner makes an amount equal to the winner’s blessing**Strategy 4- Find a optimal adjustment for company 1. Assume**all other companies Subtract Winner’s curse and Winner’s blessing from their signals to obtain their bids.**Probability, Mathematics, Tests, Homework,**Computers Bidding on an Oil Lease on the project Strategy 4-Constructing f(a) function for Company 1 must find the maximum expected value of adjustment(assuming that all other companies subtract both the curse and blessing) this best adjustment, acb**Strategy 4-**f(a) function • copy from the sheet Strategy in Auction Focus.xls to a new book • Let f(a) be the expected value for Company 1 for subtracting a million dollars from its signal, assuming that all other companies adjust their signals by both the curse and blessing. • Fit a 4th degree polynomial trend line, which we will use as an approximate formula for the unknown function f. • Use solver to find the best adjustment**Is Strategy 4 optimal ?**• No • This is the real world of business, where we expect our competitors to be well-managed companies • other 18 companies are sitting in their offices and boardrooms making the same calculations that we have just performed. Given the results, other companies will also elect to subtract less than 31.38million dollars from their signals. • It is worth noting that the 21.28million dollar adjustment that is our appropriate response to a larger reduction by the other companies, is not itself a stable strategy. Since this is less than the winner’s curse of 25 million dollars, there would be a negative expected value for extra profit if all companies adjusted downward by 21.28million dollars.**Strategy 5**-Find a optimal adjustment for company 1. Assume all other companies Subtract Winner’s curse from their signals to obtain their bids.**Probability, Mathematics, Tests, Homework,**Computers Bidding on an Oil Lease on the project Simulating, Focus Strategy 5- Constructing g(a) function for Company 1 must find the maximum expected value of adjustment(assuming that all other companies subtract both the curse and blessing) this best adjustment, ac Class Project Auction Focus.xls T C I (material continues)**Strategy 5 -g(a) function**• USE the sheet Strategy in Auction Focus.xls. • Let g(a) be the expected value for Company 1 for subtracting a million dollars from its signal, assuming that all other companies adjust their signals by curse. • Fit a 4th degree polynomial trend line, which we will use as an approximate formula for the unknown function g. • Use solver to find the best adjustment • the use of Solver in Strategy shows that g(30.8) = 0. Hence, ac = 30.8 million dollars. • Company 1’s best response to an adjustment of 25 million dollars by all other companies is to lower its signal by the considerably larger amount of $30.8M**Is Strategy 5 optimal?**if we know what all other companies plan to do. Moreover, this same information is available to all of the bidders. Need a stable strategy??? If all companies made such a stable adjustment to their signals, then there would be no incentive for anyone to alter the strategy. A stable bidding strategy is also called a Nash equilibrium**Strategy 6**Finally, each team should experiment with Auction Equilibrium.xls to determine a stable Nash equilibrium bidding strategy for its auction scenario. This will lead to a modification of your team’s signal and a specific bid in the upcoming auction. Need to enter different values for the blue cell and experiment until the two cells are equal(this will take a LONG time. We will use 10 iterations and get the average $27.031M $27.031M**Strategy 6**(2wc+wb)/2**Excel method for Strategy 6**How? (a) Use Auction Equilibrium.xls(. (b) FOLLOW THE INSTRUCTIONS IN THIS FILE! (c) Enter appropriate values in cells B10 through E10. • Enter a logical value in cell E39. Run the macro Optimize. (the first logical value to use- (2wc+wb)/2 • Enter another logical value in cell E39 and press the key F9.. record numbers in a table. • See table • Find the stable adj for strategy 6**Excel method for Strategy 6**first logical value to use for class project- (2wc+wb)/2=28.19**Strategy 6- Company 1 will Bid=$264.9M-$27.031M=$237.869M**Using Auction Equilibrium.xls to determine 10 stable strategy values, and averaging the results, we find a signal adjustment of 27.031 million dollars. This provides our Nash equilibrium and is the final answer to our bidding strategy problem. If each company reduced its signal by $27,031,000 then there would be no expected gain for any one company, if it deviated from this plan. Specifically, we will reduce our signal of $264,900,000 by $27,031,000 and submit a bid of $237,869,000.**Summary of other Strategies**Strategy 4 Strategy 5 Strategy 2 Strategy 3**Recall-Project Assumptions**Assumption1. The same 19 companies will each bid on future similar leases only bidders for the tracts(This assumption is important for the Nash concept) Assumption2. The geologists employed by companies equally expert (evidence- the Mean of errors of all historical leases is 0) on average, they can estimate the correct values of leases. evidence each signal for the value of an undeveloped tract is an observation of a continuous random variable, Sv,**Recall-Project Assumptions**Assumption3. Except for their means, the distributions of the Sv’s are all identical (The shape /The Spread)-This allows us to treat all the 20 historical leases as one sample -> We use the sample to show that mean of errors is 0 & find the standard deviation of errors) Assumption4. All of the companies act in their own best interests, have the same profit margins, and have the same needs for business. Thus, the fair value of a lease is the same for all 19 companies.**Simulation: Why?**• To estimate Winner’s Curse, why not just look at historical data? We could, but get a better estimate with more data • We need more error data! • We can do Monte Carlo simulation if we know the distribution of errors • Plot normal distribution (with mean 0 and standard deviation you found) alongside your errors**How We Know the Errors are Approximately Normally**Distributed: Graphs from Class Project Make similar graphs for your errors; use mean 0 and your standard deviation (see Normal page of Auction Focus)**Simulation: Use Normal CDFThe simulation creates a large**number of errors, coming from the same normal distribution as the ones in our historical data CDF standard normal CDF normal mean = 0, st dev =13.5 Use = NORMINV(Rand(), 0, StDev). Gives a random value from a normal distribution with mean of 0 and your team’s standard deviation**Doing the Simulation for Your Team’s Data**• Redo the graphs using a mean of 0 and your standard deviation; check that your errors are approximately normal • Make new simulation of errors for the Error Simulation page. You should have 10,000 sets of as many companies as you have. • Each entry should be = NORMINV(Rand(), µ, σ) • Check that the maximum and minimum errors are reasonable; if not press F9 • “Freeze” by doing Copy and Paste Special