Secure communication over radio channels

Abstract

We study the problem of secure communication in a multi-channel, single-hop radio network with a malicious adversary that can cause collisions and spoof messages. We assume no pre-shared secrets or trusted-third-party infrastructure. The main contribution of this paper is f-AME: a randomized (f)ast-(A)uthenticated (M)essage (E)xchange protocol that enables nodes to exchange messages in a reliable and authenticated manner. It runs in O(|E|t<sup>2</sup> log n) time and has optimal resilience to disruption, where E is the set of pairs of nodes that need to swap messages, n is the total number of nodes, C the number of channels, and t < C the number of channels on which the adversary can participate in each round. We show how to use f-AME to establish a shared secret group key, which can be used to implement a secure, reliable and authenticated long-lived communication service. The resulting service requires O(nt<sup>3</sup> log n) rounds for the setup phase, and O(t log n) rounds for an arbitrary pair to communicate. By contrast, existing solutions rely on pre-shared secrets, trusted third-party infrastructure, and/or the assumption that all interference is non-malicious.

DOI: 10.1145/1400751.1400767

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@inproceedings{Dolev2008SecureCO, title={Secure communication over radio channels}, author={Shlomi Dolev and Seth Gilbert and Rachid Guerraoui and Calvin C. Newport}, booktitle={PODC}, year={2008} }