Secure Implementation in Queueing Problems

@inproceedings{Nishizaki2012SecureII,
  title={Secure Implementation in Queueing Problems},
  author={Katsuhiko Nishizaki},
  year={2012}
}
This paper studies secure implementability (Saijo, T., T. Sj östr̈om, and T.Yamato (2007) “Secure Implementation,” Theoretical Economics 2, pp.203-229) in queueing problems. Our main result shows that the social choice function satisfies strategy-proofness and strong non-bossiness (Saijo, Sjöstr̈om, and Yamato, 2007), both of which are necessary for secure implementation, if and only if it satisfies constancy on the domains that satisfy weak indifference introduced in this paper. This result… CONTINUE READING

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