Secure Implementation †

@inproceedings{Saijo1998SecureI,
  title={Secure Implementation †},
  author={Tatsuyoshi Saijo and Tomas Sjostrom and Takehiko Yamato},
  year={1998}
}
Strategy-proofness, requiring that truth-telling is a dominant strategy, is a standard concept in social choice theory. However, the concept of strategy-proofness has serious drawbacks. First, announcing one's true preference may not be a unique dominant strategy, and using the wrong dominant strategy may lead to the wrong outcome. Second, almost all strategy-proof mechanisms have a continuum of Nash equilibria, some of which produce the wrong outcome. Third, experimental evidence shows that… CONTINUE READING

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