Searle and the "Deep Unconscious"

  title={Searle and the "Deep Unconscious"},
  author={Eric Gillett},
  journal={Philosophy, Psychiatry, \& Psychology},
  pages={191 - 200}
  • E. Gillett
  • Published 1 September 1996
  • Philosophy
  • Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology
Automaticity: a theoretical and conceptual analysis.
The authors examine whether features of automaticity can be disentangled on a conceptual level, because only then is the separate investigation of them worth the effort and conclude that the conceptual analysis of features is to a large extent feasible.
Lacan for the Philosophical Psychiatrist
Lacan, despite being largely ignored and misunderstood in Anglo-American analytic philosophy, brings psychoanalytic theory into close contact with the philosophy of mind and psychiatry as illuminated
On the Nature of Repressed Contents–A Working-Through of John Searle’s Critique
The philosopher John Searle has called Freud’s idea about repressed contents “incoherent,” “factually empty,” and “implying dualism.” Thus he has been seen as a critic of psychoanalysis. This view is


Consciousness, explanatory inversion, and cognitive science
  • J. Searle
  • Psychology, Biology
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences
  • 1990
The essential point is that intrinsic intentionality has aspectual shape: The authors' mental representations represent the world under specific aspects, and these aspectual features are essential to a mental state's being the state that it is.
The intentional stance
How are we able to understand and anticipate each other in everyday life, in our daily interactions? Through the use of such "folk" concepts as belief, desire, intention, and expectation, asserts
When functions are causes