Searle's Chinese Box: Debunking the Chinese Room Argument

  title={Searle's Chinese Box: Debunking the Chinese Room Argument},
  author={Larry Hauser},
  journal={Minds and Machines},
  • L. Hauser
  • Published 1 May 1997
  • Philosophy
  • Minds and Machines
John Searle's Chinese room argument is perhaps the most influential andwidely cited argument against artificial intelligence (AI). Understood astargeting AI proper – claims that computers can think or do think– Searle's argument, despite its rhetorical flash, is logically andscientifically a dud. Advertised as effective against AI proper, theargument, in its main outlines, is an ignoratio elenchi. It musterspersuasive force fallaciously by indirection fostered by equivocaldeployment of the… 

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