Searle’s Wall

  title={Searle’s Wall},
  author={James C. Blackmon},
In addition to his famous Chinese Room argument, John Searle has posed a more radical problem for views on which minds can be understood as programs. Even his wall, he claims, implements the WordStar program according to the standard definition of implementation because there is some “pattern of molecule movements” that is isomorphic to the formal structure of WordStar. Program implementation, Searle charges, is merely observer-relative and thus not an intrinsic feature of the world. I argue… 
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  • A. Turing
  • Computer Science
    Proc. London Math. Soc.
  • 1937
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