Scientific progress and Peircean Utopian realism

@article{Almeder1983ScientificPA,
  title={Scientific progress and Peircean Utopian realism},
  author={Robert F. Almeder},
  journal={Erkenntnis},
  year={1983},
  volume={20},
  pages={253-280}
}
  • R. Almeder
  • Published 1 November 1983
  • Mathematics
  • Erkenntnis
I argue that (1) if scientific progress, construed in revolutionary terms, were to continue indefinitely long, then any non-trivial question answerable by the use of the scientific method would in fact be answered in a way that would allow for further refinement without undermining the essential correctness of the answer; and (2) it is reasonable to believe that scientific progress will continue indefinitely long. The establishment of (1) and (2) entails that any non-trivial empirically… Expand
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