Scientific conclusions need not be accurate, justified, or believed by their authors

@article{Dang2021ScientificCN,
  title={Scientific conclusions need not be accurate, justified, or believed by their authors},
  author={Haixin Dang and Liam Kofi Bright},
  journal={Synthese},
  year={2021},
  volume={199},
  pages={8187 - 8203}
}
We argue that the main results of scientific papers may appropriately be published even if they are false, unjustified, and not believed to be true or justified by their author. To defend this claim we draw upon the literature studying the norms of assertion, and consider how they would apply if one attempted to hold claims made in scientific papers to their strictures, as assertions and discovery claims in scientific papers seem naturally analogous. We first use a case study of William H… 

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available Publishing, Belief, and Self-Trust

  • Philosophy, Psychology
  • 2022
This paper offers a defense of ‘publishing without belief’ (PWB)—the view that authors are not required to believe what they publish. I address objections to the view ranging from outright denial and

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