Scientific conclusions need not be accurate, justified, or believed by their authors

  title={Scientific conclusions need not be accurate, justified, or believed by their authors},
  author={Haixin Dang and Liam Kofi Bright},
We argue that the main results of scientific papers may appropriately be published even if they are false, unjustified, and not believed to be true or justified by their author. To defend this claim we draw upon the literature studying the norms of assertion, and consider how they would apply if one attempted to hold claims made in scientific papers to their strictures, as assertions and discovery claims in scientific papers seem naturally analogous. We first use a case study of William H… Expand


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