Scientific Realism, the Atomic Theory, and the Catch-All Hypothesis: Can We Test Fundamental Theories Against All Serious Alternatives?

@article{Stanford2009ScientificRT,
  title={Scientific Realism, the Atomic Theory, and the Catch-All Hypothesis: Can We Test Fundamental Theories Against All Serious Alternatives?},
  author={P. K. Stanford},
  journal={The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science},
  year={2009},
  volume={60},
  pages={253 - 269}
}
  • P. K. Stanford
  • Published 2009
  • Sociology
  • The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
  • Sherri Roush ([2005]) and I ([2001], [2006]) have each argued independently that the most significant challenge to scientific realism arises from our inability to consider the full range of serious alternatives to a given hypothesis we seek to test, but we diverge significantly concerning the range of cases in which this problem becomes acute. Here I argue against Roush's further suggestion that the atomic hypothesis represents a case in which scientific ingenuity has enabled us to overcome the… CONTINUE READING
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