Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World

@article{Woodward1988ScientificEA,
  title={Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World},
  author={James F. Woodward and Wesley Salmon},
  journal={No{\^u}s},
  year={1988},
  volume={22},
  pages={322}
}
The philosophical theory of scientific explanation proposed here involves a radically new treatment of causality that accords with the pervasively statistical character of contemporary science. Wesley C. Salmon describes three fundamental conceptions of scientific explanation--the epistemic, modal, and ontic. He argues that the prevailing view (a version of the epistemic conception) is untenable and that the modal conception is scientifically out-dated. Significantly revising aspects of his… 

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References

Explaining the Brain

This is probably the finest textbook on surgical pathology by British authors at present on the market, and it can be recommended most heartily, as the authors intended, to surgeons.