Corpus ID: 32501735

School of Business Arizona State University

@inproceedings{Stein2016SchoolOB,
  title={School of Business Arizona State University},
  author={L. Stein and W. P. Carey and H. Zhao},
  year={2016}
}
  • L. Stein, W. P. Carey, H. Zhao
  • Published 2016
  • When members of a board of directors are distracted by outside obligations, they may be less effective in their advisory and monitoring roles. Prior research on the adverse effects of director distraction—largely focused on directors who sit on multiple boards—offers mixed evidence, presumably because these “busy” board members may also be particularly effective ones. We focus instead on time-varying attention shocks to independent directors who are primarily employed at outside firms. Using… CONTINUE READING
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