Schelling Games on Graphs

@inproceedings{Elkind2019SchellingGO,
  title={Schelling Games on Graphs},
  author={E. Elkind and Jiarui Gan and Ayumi Igarashi and Warut Suksompong and Alexandros A. Voudouris},
  booktitle={IJCAI},
  year={2019}
}
We consider strategic games that are inspired by Schelling's model of residential segregation. In our model, the agents are partitioned into k types and need to select locations on an undirected graph. Agents can be either stubborn, in which case they will always choose their preferred location, or strategic, in which case they aim to maximize the fraction of agents of their own type in their neighborhood. We investigate the existence of equilibria in these games, study the complexity of… Expand
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Swap Stability in Schelling Games on Graphs
TLDR
This work studies a recently introduced class of strategic games that is motivated by and generalizes Schelling's well-known residential segregation model, and considers a variant of this model that is call swap Schelling games, where the number of agents is equal to thenumber of nodes of the graph, and agents may swap positions with other agents to increase their utility. Expand
Equilibria in Schelling Games: Computational Complexity and Robustness
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It is proved that deciding the existence of a swap-equilibrium and a jump-Equilibrium in this simplest model of Schelling games is NP-hard, thereby answering questions left open by Agarwal et al. Expand
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It is shown that a core stable outcome may fail to exist and checking the existence of core stable outcomes is computationally hard, and an efficient algorithm is proposed to find an individually stable outcome under the natural assumption that agents' preferences over fractions of the agents of their own type are single-peaked. Expand
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