Schelling, von Neumann, and the Event that Didn't Occur

  title={Schelling, von Neumann, and the Event that Didn't Occur},
  author={Alexander J. Field},
  journal={Conflict Studies eJournal},
  • A. Field
  • Published 23 October 2013
  • Psychology
  • Conflict Studies eJournal
Thomas Schelling was recognized by the Nobel Prize committee as a pioneer in the application of game theory and rational choice analysis to problems of politics and international relations. However, although he makes frequent references in his writings to this approach, his main explorations and insights depend upon and require acknowledgment of its limitations. One of his principal concerns was how a country could engage in successful deterrence. If the behavioral assumptions that commonly… 

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