Scaling Blockchains: Can Elected Committees Help?

  title={Scaling Blockchains: Can Elected Committees Help?},
  author={Alon Benhaim and Brett Hemenway Falk and Gerry Tsoukalas},
  journal={DecisionSciRN: Other Decision-Making in Computational Design \& Technology (Topic)},
In the high-stakes race to develop more scalable blockchains, some platforms (Cosmos, EOS, TRON, etc.) have adopted committee-based consensus protocols, whereby the blockchain's record-keeping rights are entrusted to a committee of elected block producers. In theory, the smaller the committee, the faster the blockchain can reach consensus and the more it can scale. What's less clear, is whether this mechanism ensures that honest committees can be consistently elected, given voters typically… 
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    2018 IEEE 9th International Conference on Software Engineering and Service Science (ICSESS)
  • 2018
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