Saving for Retirement: Household Bargaining and Household Net Worth

  title={Saving for Retirement: Household Bargaining and Household Net Worth},
  author={Shelly J. Lundberg and Jennifer L. Ward-Batts},
Traditional economic models treat the household as a single individual, and do not allow for separate preferences of and possible conflicts of interest between husbands and wives. Since wives are typically younger than their husbands and life expectancy for women exceeds that for men, wives may prefer to save more for retirement than do their husbands. This suggests that households in which wives have greater relative bargaining power may accumulate greater net worth as they approach retirement… CONTINUE READING

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Publications referenced by this paper.

Marriage and the Retirement Consumption Puzzle,

  • Lundberg, Shelly, Richard Startz, Steven Stillman
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Family Bargaining and Retirement Behavior,

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The Determinants of Specialization Within Marriage,

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The Retirement Behavior of Married Couples: Evidence from the Spouse’s Allowance,

  • Baker, Michael
  • NBER Working Paper No
  • 1999

Retirement in the Dual Career Family: A Structural Model,

  • Gustman, L Alan, Thomas L. Steinmeier
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