Sanctions and Civil Conflict

  title={Sanctions and Civil Conflict},
  author={Dmitriy Gershenson},
  journal={Microeconomic Theory eJournal},
  • D. Gershenson
  • Published 1 May 2001
  • Economics
  • Microeconomic Theory eJournal
Using a formal general equilibrium framework, this paper analyzes how sanctions imposed on the contestants in civil conflict affect the welfare of these contestants and the allocation of resources to conflict. It is shown that weak sanctions can hurt the contestant they are supposed to help, while strong sanctions augment the expected welfare of their intended beneficiaries. Moreover, sanctions are more likely to be successful if the contestant who is subject to sanctions can expect to derive a… 

Economic sanctions and the duration of civil conflicts

This article studies the impact of economic sanctions on the duration and outcome of intrastate conflicts. Sanctions are argued to foster the convergence of beliefs over parties’ capacity, to reduce


This paper presents a simple model to characterize the outcome of a land dispute between two rival parties using a Stackelberg game. Unlike Gershenson and Grossman (2000), we assume that the opposing

Economic sanctions, military interventions, and civil conflict outcomes

Sanctions are designed to reduce the amount of resources available to the targeted actor and have the potential to be an effective tool for bringing disputing sides in a civil conflict to the

Endogenous Destruction in a Model of Armed Conflict: Implications for Conflict Intensity, Welfare, and Third-Party Intervention

This paper employs a contest approach to study a class of territorial conflicts in which conflict-related arming is (endogenously) destructive of the contest prize. Of particular focus is the effect

Strategic Sovereign Defaults Under International Sanctions

Sanctions induce political instability. We present a model where sanctioned regimes may decide to repudiate their public debts in order to keep internal support. To be effective, this strategy

The effect of economic sanctions on the severity of genocides or politicides

ABSTRACT This study examines the effect of economic sanctions on the severity of ongoing instances of genocide or politicide. Research suggests that sanctions exacerbate human rights conditions, yet

Successful or Counterproductive Coercion? The Effect of International Sanctions on Conflict Intensity

Despite the frequent use of economic and military-specific sanctions against countries affected by civil conflicts, little is known about the possible impact that these coercive tools have on

Do economic sanctions impair target economies?

While the International Relations literature has long debated whether or not economic sanctions are an effective foreign policy tool, it neglects to empirically examine the damage sanctions impose on

A theory of competing interventions by external powers in intrastate conflicts: implications for war and armed peace

ABSTRACT This paper presents a game-theoretic model of competing interventions in civil conflict. We analyze the conflict between an incumbent government (as defender) and its rebel group (as

Pressures From Home and Abroad: Economic Sanctions and Target Government Response to Domestic Campaigns

What effect do economic sanctions have on target governments’ response to citizen campaigns? We assert that sanctions as a signal of international support for campaigners alter the bargaining



Sanctions on South Africa: What Did They Do?

This paper considers the economic sanctions that were applied in the mid-1980s to pressure the South African government to end apartheid. It asks what role those sanctions played in the eventual

The Theory of International Economic Sanctions--A Public Choice Approach: Comment

William Kaempfer and Anton Lowenberg (in this Review, September 1988) have developed an engaging model of the sanctions process grounded in public choice. They identify potentially influential

Civil Conflict

In many historical cases, victory by a challenger for political dominance over an initially dominant group has ended civil conflict. But in other places, victory by a challenger has provided only a


Four different types of equilibrium are possible within a two-player model of society where only armed self-enforcement of property rights is possible. The main underlying parameters are the total

A comparison of rent-seeking models and economic models of conflict

This paper provides a comparative analysis of the basic rent-seeking model and a simple economic model of conflict. Each model is concerned with a game in which players invest resources in pursuit of

Foreign aid and insurrection

This paper analyses the allocative and distributive effects of foreign aid within a positive theory of insurrections. In this theory, foreign aid causes a reallocation of resources from production to

Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy

Part 1 Introduction: lessons drawn from case studies historical overview the cyclical popularity of sanctions sender countries and their motives limitations on the use of sanctions plan of the book.

Swords or Plowshares? A Theory of the Security of Claims to Property

This paper develops a general equilibrium model of the allocation of resources among appropriative and productive activities. The model emphasizes the distinction between offensive weapons, which are

Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process

This work draws on insights from the experimental and theoretical literature on bargaining to provide a much-needed comprehensive treatment of the neglected subject of how wars end. In a study of how

Stealing the State: Control and Collapse in Soviet Institutions

What led to the breakdown of the Soviet Union? Steven Solnick argues, contrary to most current literature, that the Soviet system did not fall victim to stalemate at the top, or to a revolution from