Sanctioning Reputation Mechanisms in Online Trading Environments with Moral Hazard

  title={Sanctioning Reputation Mechanisms in Online Trading Environments with Moral Hazard},
  author={Chrysanthos Dellarocas},
This paper offers a systematic exploration of reputation mechanism design in trading environments with opportunistic sellers, imperfect monitoring of a seller’s actions and two possible seller effort levels, one of which has no value to buyers. The objective of reputation mechanisms in such settings is to induce sellers to exert high effort as often as possible. I study the impact of various mechanism parameters (such as the granularity of solicited feedback, the format of the public reputation… CONTINUE READING
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