• Corpus ID: 239016822

Sampling based Computation of Viability Domain to Prevent Safety Violations by Attackers

  title={Sampling based Computation of Viability Domain to Prevent Safety Violations by Attackers},
  author={Kunal Garg and Ricardo G. Sanfelice and Alvaro A. C{\'a}rdenas},
This paper studies the security of cyber-physical systems under attacks. Our goal is to design system parameters, such as a set of initial conditions and input bounds so that it is secure by design. To this end, we propose new sufficient conditions to guarantee the safety of a system under adversarial actuator attacks. Using these conditions, we propose a computationally efficient sampling-based method to verify whether a set is a viability domain for a general class of nonlinear systems. In… 

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