Salesforce Compensation: An Analytical and Empirical Examination of the Agency Theoretic Approach

@article{Misra2005SalesforceCA,
  title={Salesforce Compensation: An Analytical and Empirical Examination of the Agency Theoretic Approach},
  author={Sanjog Misra and Anne T. Coughlan and Chakravarthi Narasimhan},
  journal={Quantitative Marketing and Economics},
  year={2005},
  volume={3},
  pages={5-39}
}
Since the papers of Basu et al. (1985) and Lal and Srinivasan (1993), marketing academics have been interested in the design and implementation of optimal compensation plans. The literature has focused on agency theory as a foundation to help describe and understand this process. Although there has been much theoretical work on this topic, empirical evidence to support this theory remains sparse. Studies by Coughlan and Narasimhan (1992) and John and Weitz (1988, 1989) have found some early… CONTINUE READING

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