SUPER LIARS

@article{Schlenker2010SUPERL,
  title={SUPER LIARS},
  author={Philippe Schlenker},
  journal={The Review of Symbolic Logic},
  year={2010},
  volume={3},
  pages={374 - 414}
}
  • P. Schlenker
  • Published 11 May 2010
  • Philosophy
  • The Review of Symbolic Logic
Kripke’s theory of truth offered a trivalent semantics for a language which, like English, contains a truth predicate and means of self-reference; but it did so by severely restricting the expressive power of the logic. In Kripke’s analysis, the Liar (e.g., This very sentence is not true) receives the indeterminate truth value, but this fact cannot be expressed in the language; by contrast, it is straightforward to say in English that the Liar is something other than true. Kripke’s theory also… 
A UNIFIED THEORY OF TRUTH AND PARADOX
TLDR
A unified theory oftruth and paradox is developed, that is a theory of truth that also provides a unified account of paradoxical sentences, that yields a way of interpreting all three kinds of paradoxicals sentences, as well as unparadoxical sentences within a single model.
Embracing intensionality: Paradoxicality and semi-truth operators in fixed point models
TLDR
This paper extends the account of semantic paradox via the addition of intensional operators such as ``is paradoxical'' to characterize the difference between sentences that receive the same semantic value in minimal fixed points yet seem to involve distinct semantic phenomena.
Vagueness, Truth and Permissive Consequence
We say that a sentence A is a permissive consequence of a set of premises Γ whenever, if all the premises of Γ hold up to some standard, then A holds to some weaker standard. In this paper, we focus
Chapter 21 Vagueness , Truth and Permissive Consequence
We say that a sentence A is a permissive consequence of a set of premises ! whenever, if all the premises of ! hold up to some standard, then A holds to some weaker standard. In this paper, we focus
UvA-DARE ( Digital Academic Repository ) Vagueness , truth and permissive consequence
We say that a sentence A is a permissive consequence of a set of premises Γ whenever, if all the premises of Γ hold up to some standard, then A holds to some weaker standard. In this paper, we focus
Sets and supersets
TLDR
This paper takes seriously the idea that the authors can talk about the collection of all the sets and many more collections beyond that and argues that this approach provides a natural extension to ordinary set theory and leaves ordinary mathematical practice untouched.
Fixed-point models for paradoxical predicates
This paper introduces a new kind of fixed-point semantics, filling a gap within approaches to Liar-like paradoxes involving fixed-point models à la Kripke (1975). The four-valued models presented
Identifying Authorship from Linguistic Text Patterns
TLDR
This research presents a methodology to compare texts to identify whether two texts are written by the same or different authors, which includes an algorithm to analyze the proximity of text, based upon Zipf's Law.

References

SHOWING 1-10 OF 39 REFERENCES
A Revenge-Immune Solution to the Semantic Paradoxes
TLDR
There is a general consistency/conservativeness proof that shows that talk of truth and the various “levels of defectiveness” can all be made coherent together within a single object language.
The Elimination of Self-Reference: Generalized Yablo-Series and the Theory of Truth
TLDR
It is shown that in the Strong Kleene trivalent logic Yablo’s results are a special case of a more general fact: under certain conditions, any semantic phenomenon that involves self-reference can be emulated without self- reference.
Toward Useful Type-Free Theories. I
TLDR
The informal argument that the paradoxes are blocked in ZF is that its axioms are true in the cumulative hierarchy of sets where (i) unlike the theory of types, a set may have members of various (ordinal) levels, but (ii) the level of a set is greater than that of each of its members.
What Truth Depends on
TLDR
A theory of dependence is introduced according to which a sentence φ is said to depend on a set Φ of sentences iff the truth value of φ supervenes on the presence or absence of the sentences of Φ in/from the extension of the truth predicate.
New Grounds for Naive Truth Theory
A theory is semantically closed if it contains, for each sentence A of the language in which it is framed, all biconditionals of the form T[A] ≡ A. Tarski showed that no consistent 1 order theory
Semantik: Ein Internationales Handbuch Der Zeitgenössischen Forschung
TLDR
The aim of this handbook is to represent the body of theoretical knowledge which has evolved in the international research of the last two decades, and is indispensable for all research in linguistics and neighboring disciplines.
The Semantic Paradoxes and the Paradoxes of Vagueness
Both in dealing with the semantic paradoxes and in dealing with vagueness and indeterminacy, there is some temptation to weaken classical logic: in par­ ticular, to restrict the law of excluded
A Contextual-Hierarchical Approach to Truth and the Liar Paradox
This paper presents an approach to truth and the Liar paradox which combines elements of context dependence and hierarchy. This approach is developed formally, using the techniques of model theory in
The Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foundations of Semantics
X is true if, and only if, p. [...] we shall call a definition of truth “adequate” if all these equivalences follow from it. [...] The definition of truth which was outlined above [...] implies all
Conditionals as Definite Descriptions (A Referential Analysis)
Lewis 1973 observed that his logic for counterfactuals could be applied to definite descriptions. His generalization was that the latter display the same non-monotonic patterns as the former,
...
...