• Corpus ID: 14491147

SUMMARY : Rationality and institutions : an inquiry into the normative implications of rational choice theory

@inproceedings{Engelen2008SUMMARYR,
  title={SUMMARY : Rationality and institutions : an inquiry into the normative implications of rational choice theory},
  author={Bart Engelen},
  year={2008}
}

• Bart Engelen
• Published 2008
• Economics

PHD THESIS SUMMARY: Rationality and institutions: an inquiry into the normative implications of rational choice theory. In my dissertation, I aim to analyze what a desirable basic institutional structure looks like from the perspective of rational choice theory. While the main topic is thus normative in nature, I start by clarifying in the first part what the notion of rationality exactly entails. I do so by focusing explicitly on the economic conception of rationality, according to which a rational individual is motivated to serve his self-interest on the basis of cost-benefit calculations. Such a homo economicus is characterized by intentional and instrumental actions, perfectly informed beliefs and exogenously given and egoistic preferences. In my view, however, this model is inadequate if one aims to understand what it means to be rational. All of the above mentioned requirements turn out to be overly demanding in this respect. That is why I suggest dropping these assumptions in order to construct what I label the minimal conception of rationality. Since the latter turns out to be very formal indeed, I propose two further alternatives, which focus not so much on the choice of means to achieve certain goals but rather on the choice of those goals themselves. According to the first, broad conception, actions are rational if they are based on good reasons, which are further qualified as well-informed beliefs and autonomous preferences. According to the second, expressive conception, actions, beliefs and preferences are rational if they express the things people care about. The latter requires that people can reflect upon and identify with their reasons, which implies a capacity to reflect upon and distance themselves from their own bundle of preferences. In the second part of this dissertation, I try to show the value and limitations of these conceptions by applying them to decisions in the context of large-scaled elections. In this respect, it becomes immediately clear that the economic conception fails to explain why quite a lot of