SMASHER: a strategy-proof combinatorial auction mechanism for heterogeneous channel redistribution

@inproceedings{Zheng2013SMASHERAS,
  title={SMASHER: a strategy-proof combinatorial auction mechanism for heterogeneous channel redistribution},
  author={Zhenzhe Zheng and Fan Wu and Guihai Chen},
  booktitle={MobiHoc},
  year={2013}
}
Auction is believed to be an effective way to solve or relieve the problem of radio spectrum shortage, by dynamically redistributing idle wireless channels of primary users to secondary users. However, to design a practical channel auction mechanism, we have to consider five challenges, including strategy-proofness, channel spatial reusability, channel heterogeneity, bid diversity, and social welfare maximization. Unfortunately, none of the existing works fully considered the five design… CONTINUE READING

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