author={Mohammad O. Pervaiz and Mihaela Cardei and Jie Wu},
Over the last years, wireless local area networks (WLANs) have experienced a tremendous growth, becoming an integral part of enterprises, homes and other businesses. One of the most important issues in the development of WLANs is providing a secure communication. Because of the broadcast nature of the wireless communication, it becomes easy for an attacker to intercept the signal or to disturb the normal operation of the network. Although the early versions of WLANs were not designed for… 

Figures and Tables from this paper

An Approach for Prevention of MitM Attack Based on Rogue AP in Wireless Network
This work proposes a dynamic password technology named Two-way Dynamic Authentication Technology (TDAT), which uses two-factor during the initial authentication, and uses a two-way hash chain during the cross-domain authentication to overcome MitM attack.
Design And Hardware Implementation Of A Novel Scrambling Security Algorithm For Robust Wireless Local Area Networks
This thesis entails designing, evaluating and prototyping a wireless security infrastructure that can be used with the WEP protocol optionally, thus reducing the security vulnerabilities and provides the design and implementation of a novel scheme in Matlab and VHDL to improve the security of WEP in all aspects.
The Proliferation of Wireless Devices and its Role in Corporate Governance
The need to consider possible risks to ensure business survival and business continuity before the implementation of new technologies, with specific interest to wireless networks and wireless devices is discussed.


Intercepting mobile communications: the insecurity of 802.11
Several serious security flaws in the Wired Equivalent Privacy protocol are discovered, stemming from mis-application of cryptographic primitives, which lead to a number of practical attacks that demonstrate that WEP fails to achieve its security goals.
Analysis of the 802.11i 4-way handshake
The 4-Way Handshake protocol is analyzed using a finite-state verification tool and a Denial-of-Service attack is found, involving forging initial messages from the authenticator to the supplicant to produce inconsistent keys in peers.
Real 802.11 Security: Wi-Fi Protected Access and 802.11i
This chapter discusses the relationship between Wi-Fi and IEEE 802.1X, EAP, and RADIUS, and how the Layers are Implemented, and the importance of Access Control for Dial-in Users.
Wireless lan medium access control (mac) and physical layer (phy) specifications
The medium access control (MAC) and physical characteristics for wireless local area networks (LANs) are specified in this standard, part of a series of standards for local and metropolitan area
Weaknesses in the temporal key hash of WPA
Given a few RC4 packet keys in WPA it is possible to find the Temporal Key (TK) and the Message Integrity Check (MIC) key and this shows that parts of WPA are weak on their own.
Unsafe at any key size; An analysis of the WEP encapsulation
It is infeasible to achieve privacy with the WEP encapsulation by simply increasing key size, and the characteristics needed by any encryption algorithm that can effectively provide data privacy in a wireless environment are identified, and a replacement encapsulation is recommended.
Using the Fluhrer, Mantin, and Shamir Attack to Break WEP
It is concluded that 802.11 WEP is totally insecure, and some recommendations are provided to make the attack more efficient.
The RC4 encryption algorithm
The RC4 encryption algorithm was developed by Ronald Rivest of RSA and is used by standards such as IEEE 802.11 within WEP (Wireless Encryption Protocol) using a 40 and 128-bit keys.
IEEE Standards for Local and metropolitan area networks
The SILS components and their relationships to applications, communications protocols, system management, and security management are described.
CBC MACs for Arbitrary-Length Messages: The Three-Key Constructions
This work proposes some simple variants of the CBC MAC that enable the efficient authentication of arbitrary-length messages and proves the security of this and other constructions, giving concrete bounds on an adversary’s inability to forge in terms of his inability to distinguish the block cipher from a random permutation.