Rules and Discretion with Non-coordinated Monetary and Fiscal Policy

@article{Alesina1987RulesAD,
  title={Rules and Discretion with Non-coordinated Monetary and Fiscal Policy},
  author={A. Alesina and G. Tabellini},
  journal={Economic Inquiry},
  year={1987},
  volume={25}
}
  • A. Alesina, G. Tabellini
  • Published 1987
  • Economics
  • Economic Inquiry
  • The time inconsistency of optimal monetary policy is due to the effects of tax distortions. Thus, the issue of how to im prove upon the time-consistent suboptimal monetary policy is related to that of the coordination of monetary and fiscal policy. The author s present a model with three players (the central bank, the fiscal au thority, and wage setters) in which distortionary taxes are explicitl y modeled. They show that binding commitments to monetary rules are n ot necessarily welfare… CONTINUE READING
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