Rules, Communication and Collusion: Narrative Evidence from the Sugar Institute Case

@article{Genesove2001RulesCA,
  title={Rules, Communication and Collusion: Narrative Evidence from the Sugar Institute Case},
  author={David Genesove and Wallace P. Mullin},
  journal={IO: Theory},
  year={2001}
}
  • David Genesove, Wallace P. Mullin
  • Published 2001
  • Economics
  • IO: Theory
  • Detailed notes on weekly meetings of the sugar-refining cartel show how communication helps firms collude, and so highlight the deficiencies in the current formal theory of collusion. The Sugar Institute did not fix prices or output. Prices were increased by homogenizing business practices to make price cutting more transparent. Meetings were used to interpret and adapt the agreement, coordinate on jointly profitable actions, ensure unilateral actions were not misconstrued as cheating, and… CONTINUE READING
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