Routing Games in the Wild: Efficiency, Equilibration and Regret (Large-Scale Field Experiments in Singapore)

@article{Monnot2017RoutingGI,
  title={Routing Games in the Wild: Efficiency, Equilibration and Regret (Large-Scale Field Experiments in Singapore)},
  author={Barnab{\'e} Monnot and Francisco Benita and Georgios Piliouras},
  journal={ArXiv},
  year={2017},
  volume={abs/1708.04081}
}
Routing games are amongst the most well studied domains of game theory. How relevant are these pen-and-paper calculations to understanding the reality of everyday traffic routing? We focus on a semantically rich dataset that captures detailed information about the daily behavior of thousands of Singaporean commuters and examine the following basic questions: (i) Does the traffic equilibrate? (ii) Is the system behavior consistent with latency minimizing agents? (iii) Is the resulting system… 
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