Ron was wrong, Whit is right

Abstract

We performed a sanity check of public keys collected on the web. Our main goal was to test the validity of the assumption that different random choices are made each time keys are generated. We found that the vast majority of public keys work as intended. A more disconcerting finding is that two out of every one thousand RSA moduli that we collected offer no security. Our conclusion is that the validity of the assumption is questionable and that generating keys in the real world for “multiple-secrets” cryptosystems such as RSA is significantly riskier than for “single-secret” ones such as ElGamal or (EC)DSA which are based on Diffie-Hellman.

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@article{Lenstra2012RonWW, title={Ron was wrong, Whit is right}, author={Arjen K. Lenstra and James P. Hughes and Maxime Augier and Joppe W. Bos and Thorsten Kleinjung and Christophe Wachter}, journal={IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive}, year={2012}, volume={2012}, pages={64} }