Robust and Efficient Incentives for Cooperative Content Distribution

  title={Robust and Efficient Incentives for Cooperative Content Distribution},
  author={Michael Sirivianos and Xiaowei Yang and Stanislaw Jarecki},
  journal={IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking},
Content distribution via the Internet is becoming increasingly popular. To be cost-effective, commercial content providers are now using peer-to-peer (P2P) protocols such as BitTorrent to save bandwidth costs and to handle peak demands. When an online content provider uses a P2P protocol, it faces an incentive issue: how to motivate its clients to upload to their peers. This paper presents Dandelion, a system designed to address this issue. Unlike previous incentive-compatible systems, such as… 

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