• Corpus ID: 203600272

Robust Pricing in Dynamic Mechanism Design

  title={Robust Pricing in Dynamic Mechanism Design},
  author={Yuan Deng and S{\'e}bastien Lahaie and Vahab S. Mirrokni},
Motivated by the repeated sale of online ads via auctions, optimal pricing in repeated auctions has attracted a large body of research. While dynamic mechanisms offer powerful techniques to improve on both revenue and efficiency by optimizing auctions across different items, their reliance on exact distributional information of buyers’ valuations (present and future) limits their use in practice. In this paper, we propose robust dynamic mechanism design. We develop a new framework to design… 
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