• Corpus ID: 245124089

Robust Implementation with Costly Information

  title={Robust Implementation with Costly Information},
  author={Harry Di Pei and Bruno H. Strulovici},
: We design mechanisms that robustly implement any desired social choice function when (i) agents must incur a cost to learn the state of the world, (ii) with small probability, agents’ preferences can be arbitrarily different from some baseline known to the social planner, and (iii) the planner does not know agents’ beliefs and higher-order beliefs about one another’s preferences. The mechanisms we propose have a natural interpretation and are robust to trembles in agents’ reporting strategies… 
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