Robust Implementation: The Role of Large Type Spaces

@inproceedings{Bergemann2005RobustIT,
  title={Robust Implementation: The Role of Large Type Spaces},
  author={Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris},
  year={2005}
}
We analyze the problem of fully implementing a social choice function when the planner does not know the agents’ beliefs about other agents’ types. We identify an ex post monotonicity condition that is necessary and in economic environments sufficient for full implementation in ex post equilibrium; we also identify an ex post monotonicity no veto condition that is sufficient. These results are the ex post equilibrium analogues of Jackson’s (1991) results about Bayesian implementation. We show… CONTINUE READING

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