• Published 2006

Robust Herding with Endogenous Ordering and One-Sided Commitment

@inproceedings{Zhang2006RobustHW,
  title={Robust Herding with Endogenous Ordering and One-Sided Commitment},
  author={Yi Zhang},
  year={2006}
}
When making sequential decisions under imperfect information, one may learn from other people’s choices. Herding occurs when people ignore their own information and follow their predecessors. Consequently, their decisions are uninformative to others, which prevents information aggregation. Therefore, the initial realization of signals can have long-term consequences and herd behavior is often error prone. We analyze an endogenous ordering sequential decision model with one-sided commitment in… CONTINUE READING

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