Corpus ID: 237940801

Robust Coordination in Networks

  title={Robust Coordination in Networks},
  author={Laura Arditti and Giacomo Como and Fabio Fagnani and Martina Vanelli},
We study the robustness of binary-action heterogeneous network coordination games equipped with an external field modeling the different players’ biases towards one action with respect to the other one. We prove necessary and sufficient conditions for global stability of consensus equilibria under best response type dynamics, robustly with respect to (constant or time-varying) values of the external field. We then apply these results to the analysis of mixed network coordination and… Expand
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