Corpus ID: 14329044

Robust Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma: Program Equilibrium via Provability Logic

@article{Brsz2014RobustCI,
  title={Robust Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma: Program Equilibrium via Provability Logic},
  author={Mih{\'a}ly B{\'a}r{\'a}sz and Paul Francis Christiano and Benja Fallenstein and Marcello Herreshoff and Patrick LaVictoire and Eliezer Yudkowsky},
  journal={ArXiv},
  year={2014},
  volume={abs/1401.5577}
}

Mihály Bárász, Paul Francis Christiano, +3 authors Eliezer Yudkowsky

Published in ArXiv 2014

Mathematics, Computer Science

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We consider the one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma between algorithms with read-access to one anothers' source codes, and we use the modal logic of provability to build agents that can achieve mutual cooperation in a manner that is robust, in that cooperation does not require exact equality of the agents' source code, and unexploitable, meaning that such an agent never cooperates when its opponent defects. We construct a general framework for such "modal agents", and study their properties.