Ridesharing with Driver Location Preferences

  title={Ridesharing with Driver Location Preferences},
  author={Duncan Rheingans-Yoo and Scott Duke Kominers and Hongyao Ma and David C. Parkes},
  • Duncan Rheingans-Yoo, Scott Duke Kominers, +1 author David C. Parkes
  • Published in IJCAI 2019
  • Computer Science
  • We study revenue-optimal pricing and driver compensation in ridesharing platforms when drivers have heterogeneous preferences over locations. If a platform ignores drivers' location preferences, it may make inefficient trip dispatches; moreover, drivers may strategize so as to route towards their preferred locations. In a model with stationary and continuous demand and supply, we present a mechanism that incentivizes drivers to both (i) report their location preferences truthfully and (ii… CONTINUE READING

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