Corpus ID: 51876218

Reward Sharing Schemes for Stake Pools

  title={Reward Sharing Schemes for Stake Pools},
  author={Lars Br{\"u}njes and A. Kiayias and E. Koutsoupias and Aikaterini-Panagiota Stouka},
  • Lars Brünjes, A. Kiayias, +1 author Aikaterini-Panagiota Stouka
  • Published 2018
  • Computer Science, Mathematics
  • ArXiv
  • We introduce and study reward sharing schemes that promote the fair formation of stake pools in collaborative projects that involve a large number of stakeholders such as the maintenance of a proof-of-stake (PoS) blockchain. Our mechanisms are parameterised by a target value for the desired number of pools. We show that by properly incentivising participants, the desired number of stake pools is a non-myopic Nash equilibrium arising from rational play. Our equilibria also exhibit an efficiency… CONTINUE READING

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