Revisiting rationality for agents with intentions 1

@inproceedings{Cavedon1995RevisitingRF,
  title={Revisiting rationality for agents with intentions 1},
  author={Lawrence Cavedon and Lin Padgam and Anand Rao and Elizabeth Sonenbergy},
  year={1995}
}
Formal frameworks for the speciication of autonomous agents are commonly based on logics of intention and belief. Desirable properties for logics of intention are particularly non-standard, even more so than for logics of belief. In this paper, we address problems with existing logics of intention and belief by shifting to a non-classical semantics, making use of Rantala's impossible, or non-normal, worlds. Our framework invalidates the problematic properties of intention and, by imposing… CONTINUE READING

From This Paper

Topics from this paper.

References

Publications referenced by this paper.
Showing 1-8 of 8 references

Intention is choice with commitment

P. R. Cohen, H. J. Levesque
Arti cial Intelligence, 42(3) • 1990
View 2 Excerpts

Inquiry

R. Stalnaker
MIT Press, Cambridge • 1987
View 1 Excerpt

Intentions

M. E. Bratman
Plans, and Practical Reason. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA • 1987
View 2 Excerpts

Asymmetry thesis and sidee ect problems in linear time andbranching time intention logics

M. P. George.
1982

Impossible worlds semantics and logical omniscience

V Rantala
I Niniluoto and E Saarinen, editors, Intensional Logic: Theory and Applications, volume 35, pages 106{115. Acta Philosoph- ica Fennica • 1982
View 3 Excerpts

Similar Papers

Loading similar papers…