Revenue analysis of a family of ranking rules for keyword auctions

  title={Revenue analysis of a family of ranking rules for keyword auctions},
  author={S{\'e}bastien Lahaie and David M. Pennock},
  booktitle={EC '07},
Keyword auctions lie at the core of the business models of today's leading search engines. Advertisers bid for placement alongside search results, and are charged for clicks on their ads. Advertisers are typically ranked according to a score that takes into account their bids and potential click-through rates. We consider a family of ranking rules that contains those typically used to model Yahoo! and Google's auction designs as special cases. We find that in general neither of these is… 

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