Revenue Enhancement in Ad Auctions

@inproceedings{Feldman2011RevenueEI,
  title={Revenue Enhancement in Ad Auctions},
  author={Michal Feldman and R. Meir and Moshe Tennenholtz},
  booktitle={WINE},
  year={2011}
}
We consider the revenue of the Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction, which is one of the most widely used mechanisms for ad auctions. While the standard model of ad auctions implies that the revenue of GSP in equilibrium is at least as high as the revenue of VCG, the literature suggests that it is not strictly higher due to the selection of a natural equilibrium that coincides with the VCG outcome. We propose a randomized modification of the GSP mechanism, which eliminates the low-revenue… 
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