Revenge: John Sherman, Russell Alger and the origins of the Sherman Act

  title={Revenge: John Sherman, Russell Alger and the origins of the Sherman Act},
  author={Patrick Newman},
  journal={Public Choice},
This paper argues that Senator John Sherman of Ohio was motivated to introduce an antitrust bill in late 1889 partly as a way of enacting revenge on his political rival, General and former Governor Russell Alger of Michigan, because Sherman believed that Alger personally had cost him the presidential nomination at the 1888 Republican national convention. When discussing his bill on the Senate floor and elsewhere, Sherman repeatedly brought up Alger’s relationship, which in reality was rather… Expand

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