Revelation gap for pricing from samples

  title={Revelation gap for pricing from samples},
  author={Yiding Feng and Jason D. Hartline and Yingkai Li},
  journal={Proceedings of the 53rd Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing},
This paper considers prior-independent mechanism design, in which a single mechanism is designed to achieve approximately optimal performance on every prior distribution from a given class. Most results in this literature focus on mechanisms with truthtelling equilibria, a.k.a., truthful mechanisms. Feng and Hartline [FOCS 2018] introduce the revelation gap to quantify the loss of the restriction to truthful mechanisms. We solve a main open question left in Feng and Hartline [FOCS 2018]; namely… 

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